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Abstract 
A business model can provide a clear framework for how a company delivers value to 
its customers. The better the business model is understood, the greater the ability for the 
company to understand how to improve its business to continually deliver greater value to its 
customers. Through the process of business model innovation, companies can transform their 
success by delivering customer value in an entirely different way. As such, understanding 
business model innovation is considered critical for transformational and sustained growth of a 
company. Business model innovation, however, is a fairly new concept and understanding how 
it actually occurs in practice is rare. This project offers a unique first-hand insight (i.e. 
autoethnography) into the process of how business model innovation occurs in a firm (Tesera 
Systems Inc.) over a long period of time ( ~ 7 years) and continues to evolve. 
This project shows that the actual experience ofTesera relates very well to the theories 
and concepts of business model innovation (i.e. framework, drivers/needs ofbusiness model 
innovation, typology, ontologies) and benefits (i.e. improvements in agility, resource velocity, 
cost structures). In addition, this project offers learning perspectives from this business model 
innovation experience (i.e. crisis as opportunity, value gained from understanding implicit 
business model innovation, the importance of a constructionist ontology, business model 
innovation to guide business processes externally and internally). As such, this project helps to 
provide value to both the theoretical and conceptual perspectives regarding business model 
innovation as well as those who in business are looking to better understand business model 
innovation from a practical experience to provide their firms the opportunity for 
transformational change and sustained success. 
ii 
Table of Contents 
Abstract .................. ....... ......... ........................... ...... ........ .......................... .. ...... ... ............ ...... ... ii 
Table of Contents ..................................................................................................................... iii 
List ofFigures ........................................................................................................................... v 
Acknowledgement/Dedication ..... ................... ... ..... ........ ... .. .. ................ ........... .. .. .. .... ...... .... .. vi 
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 
2 Literature Review .. ......... ......... ........... .................. .................. ....... ................................ ..... 1 
2.1 The Business Model and its Importance ...................................................................... 1 
2.1.1 Business Model Definitions .................................................................................. 2 
2.2 Business Model Innovation ..... .. .... .. .......... ...... .. ........... ..................... .... ...... ....... ........ .. 3 
2.2.1 Business Model Innovation Framework and Typology ..... ...... ...................... ....... 4 
2.2.2 Business Model Innovation and a Constructionist/Post-Positivist View .............. 7 
2.2.3 Challenges of Business Model Innovation and a Need for Better Understanding 7 
3 Data and Methodology .... .......... .... ........... ............ .. .. .................. ... .... ...... ......... .... ....... ... .... 8 
3.1 Methodology, Research Strategy and Research Design .... ................. ......... .. .. .. ......... . 8 
3.2 Research Questions ...................................................................................................... 9 
3.3 The Unit of Analysis- The Firm (Tesera Systems Inc.) ............................................. 9 
3.3 .1 Period 1: Pre-incorporation - The Genesis of the Firm ................... ...... ............. 10 
3.3.2 Period 2: Incorporation of the Firm (as a For-Profit Subsidiary) ....................... 11 
3.3.3 Period 3: An Independent Firm- Tesera Systems Inc ....................................... 14 
3.3.4 Period 4: The Perfect Storm ............................................................................... 17 
3.3.5 Period 5: Survival Mode ........... .. ........ ......... ............. .......... .... ....... ... ........ ......... 21 
3.3.6 Period 6: Establishing "Pillars" for Recovery .................................................... 24 
3.3.7 Period 7: The Development ofthe Collaborative Business Model.. ... .. .. ........... 27 
3.3.8 Period 8: The Implementation of the Collaborative Business Model (the 
breakthrough) ........... ............... ..... ....... ..... ...... ....................... .. ....... ..................... 29 
3.3.9 Period 9: The Growth and Evolution of the Collaborative Business Model.. .. .. 32 
4 Discussion/Results ............................................................................................................ 3 8 
4.1 Synopsis Business Model Innovation process with Tesera ....................................... 38 
4.1.1 Triggers and Responses ofBusiness Model Innovation .... .... .... ..... ... ... ........... ... 39 
4.1.2 The Resulting Description ofTesera 's Collaborative Business Model ... ..... ...... 42 
4.2 Business Model Innovation Theories/Concepts that are Supported by this Case .. .... 43 
4.2.1 Needs for Business Model Innovation ................................................................ 43 
4.2.2 Emphasis on Cultural and Ontological changes to Enable Business Model 
Innovation ............................................................................................................ 44 
4.2.3 Improving Resource Velocity and Cost Structures through Business Model 
Innovation ............................................................................................................ 45 
iii 
4.2.4 Types of Business Model Innovation ........... ....................................................... 46 
4.2.5 The Importance of the Business Model... ............................................................ 47 
4.3 Learning from this Experience and Considerations for Future Business Model 
Innovation ... ........................................... .. .............................................. .. .................. 4 7 
4.3.1 Understanding Implicit Business Model Innovation ........... ........ ............... ........ . 48 
4.3.2 Crisis as an Opportunity for Business Model Innovation ....................... ........ .... 48 
4.3.3 Business Model Innovation: a Mindset.. ............................................................. 49 
4.3.4 Business Model Innovation: Source oflnspiration and a Guiding Light.. .......... 49 
4.3.5 Business Model Innovation- Considerations Moving Forward ......................... 50 
5 Conclusion ....... .... .......... .... .......................... .. ............................................................. ...... 51 
6 References ........ ............... .......... ... ............................................ ..... ....................... ............ 53 
7 Appendices ..... ........... ............... .. .. ........ ............. ....... ....................................................... . 56 
Appendix A- Examples of Business Model Definitions ....................................................... 57 
iv 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. 4 box business model framework ..... ... ... .. ... ... ....... .......... .. ....... ... ... ...... ............ ........ 5 
Figure 2. Relationship between the MMFA and MRAG (i.e. Tesera Systems Inc.) ...... .. .... . 12 
v 
Acknowledgement/Dedication 
I would first like to thank Bruce MacArthur, President and CEO ofTesera Systems. Through my 
evolving role in Tesera, Bruce provided me an unparalleled opportunity and support to 
discover my passion and express my creativity in business. I would also like to express my 
gratitude to the employees ofTesera for being such a great team and embracing change and 
new ideas, which greatly contributed to the ability to transform the company in so many 
positive ways. I would also like to thank our great network of collaborative 
partners/companies and also our wonderful clients who have embraced the values that have 
resulted from our business model innovations and our collaborative business model. The 
positive and long-terms relationships that have developed continually inspires us to achieve 
better and better things. 
I would also like to thank all the many influencers that have inspired my passion for business, 
which includes many people who have shared their business stories and experiences, and many 
great authors of business books and articles who are mentioned in this paper. In particularly 
Bo Burlingham (author of Small Giants) who not only inspired the "Small Giants" philosophy, 
but also helped me understand the source of my passion for business. I'm very fortunate that 
I've had the great pleasure of getting to know Bo personally through this project. In a similar 
context, I would also like to thank my supervisor Dr. Elizabeth Croft for not only providing 
valuable guidance for this project, but also exposing me to business model innovation and 
contributing to my growing passion for business strategy. 
Most importantly, I would like to offer my enormous gratitude to my wife Jacqueline Pettersen, 
my children, Kai and Max, and my parents Tore and Geraldine Pettersen. They have been an 
incredible source of support and inspiration in so many ways that are beyond definition. It is to 
my wonderful family that I dedicate this project. 
vi 
1 Introduction 
Many entrepreneurs and companies run successful businesses without explicitly 
knowing or being able to define or describe their business model. Yet, all successful 
companies have a successful business model, whether or not they know what it is or can 
describe it (Magretta 2002, Johnson et a/. 2008). Running a successful company, no matter 
how big or small, involves a complex mix and balance of many different elements 
(organizational behaviour, strategy, finance, marketing, governance, human resources, etc.) 
with a product/service that people are willing to pay for. This mix and balance is different for 
every business. Companies can operate very successfully to establish the right mix and 
balance based on experience, intuition, acquired skills, evolving business philosophies etc. This 
can all occur within a company without ever knowing what a business model is, so why is a 
business model necessary? 
This project will highlight the importance of the business model and most importantly 
the process of business model innovation by using the practical experience of a firm that has 
implemented the process of business model innovation over the past 7 years. The intent is to 
provide a greater understanding of how business model innovation works in a real world 
context, and to relate this experience to the existing theories, frameworks conceptualization 
frameworks for business model innovation as well as potentially offering any new perspectives 
that may arise. 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 The Business Model and its Importance 
Given all the complexities and inner workings that can occur within a business, it can 
be challenging to explicitly understand what makes a business work. Businesses can have a 
certain "je ne sa is quoi" that contributes to the success of the business, but if no one can really 
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understand from a very basic point of view what makes the business successful, it is difficult to 
ensure everyone is "pulling in the same direction" and to improve or enhance the successful 
elements or look for new ways to contribute to success that build upon the existing business. 
One of the tools that can be used to distill a business down to its salient elements is the 
business model. The concept of the business model gained popularity in the "dot com" era of 
the late 1990s and, despite falling out of favour (primarily through misuse/abuse in raising 
capital), the value of the business model is again being recognized as an essential tool to 
successful organizations (Magretta 2002, Teece 2010). Chesbrough (2010, 355) suggests " ... a 
mediocre technology within a great business model may be more valuable than a great 
technology exploited via a mediocre business model". 
2.1.1 Business Model Definitions 
A model is an abstract of reality and can range from being very simple (i.e. to capture 
the primary characteristics of reality), to being very complex (i.e. to try to explain as much of 
the detail of the reality as possible). There are several ways that business models are 
conceptualized ranging from narratives/stories to aligning with quantitative aspects of the 
firm (Magretta 2002; Daganova and Eyquem-Renault 2009). Similarly, Teece (2010, 173) 
emphasizes that" ... a business model is a conceptual model (rather than a financial model) of a 
business", though it can become embedded in such things as business plans, financial 
statements and cash flow projections. 
Johnson (2010) discusses the broad range of business model definitions and this is 
further illustrated by Baden-Fuller and Morgan (2010,158) with examples of business model 
definitions from various writers (see Appendix A). Despite the different definitions, there 
appears to be a common understanding of the principles of the business model and what role it 
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represents to the firm. Svejenova eta/. (2010, 409) succinctly summarizes the business model 
as " ... an organizational device that reveals a company's logic for creating and capturing value 
and also its approach to constant renewal". Similarly Johnson (2010, 22) summarizes the 
essence of the business model as "a representation for how a business creates and delivers 
value, both for the customer and the company" and Baden-Fuller and Morgan (2010, 157) 
suggests the " ... role of business models is to provide a set of generic level descriptors of how a 
firm organizes itself to create and distribute value in a profitable manner." Comparably, Zott 
and Am it (20 10, 217) describe the objective of the business model is " ... to exploit a business 
opportunity by providing value for the parties involved i.e., to fulfill customers' needs and 
create customer surplus while generating a profit for the focal firm and its partners". 
There isn't necessarily a right or wrong business model definition, however, the 
definition should suit the purpose of how the business model is to be used. For example, if the 
purpose of the business model is to get all employees in an organization on the same page so 
that everyone can understand the "big picture" of how the business operates, generates profits 
and is sustainable, then a descriptive/narrative business model may be perfect. In this case, 
having everyone understanding the general principles of the company so that everyone knows 
what makes the difference is more important than the intricate quantitative details. 
2.2 Business Model Innovation 
A business model is also an important tool when in comes to responding to change as 
well as taking advantage of specific opportunities (i.e. business model innovation). Peter 
Drucker's article "The Theory of the Business" (Drucker 1994) helped to characterize the 
importance of understanding the principles of how the business works (a similar concept as the 
business model) and recognized that key assumptions to the theory must remain valid (i.e. 
organizational environment, the mission of the organization, and the organization's core 
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competencies). If the assumptions are, or become, incorrect, the theory of the business is 
invalid. Drucker's conceptualization of the Theory of the Business could certainly be 
considered a prelude to the concept of business models, and also to the concept of business 
model innovation, as he was very proactive in his recommendations to ensure the Theory of the 
Business remained valid (assumptions must fit reality and one another, the theory must be 
known and understood throughout the organizations, and the theory has to be tested 
constantly). 
Johnson (2010) builds upon Drucker's concept by explicitly defining the process of 
business model innovation as occurring when a company innovates the very theory of the 
business itself. This occurs when a company fundamentally changes the way it derives profit, 
accesses resources, processes and expertise, and coordinates/controls activities. In doing so, a 
company delivers new value to the market by "reconsidering the fundamental building blocks 
that make the business work" in what Johnson (2010) refers to as a company's "white space" of 
opportunities (e.g. transform/create markets, redefine entire industries). Similar 
characterizations of redefining the fundamental elements of the business (i.e. business model 
innovation) have been presented by others (e.g. Markrides 1997, 2006; Kim and Mauborgne 
1997, 2004; Hamel 1998). 
2.2.1 Business Model Innovation Framework and Typology 
Johnson (2010) has developed a conceptual framework to understand the drivers of 
business models and to understand when business model innovation is needed. He refers to 
this as the "4 box business model framework" (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. 4 box business model framework 
(Reproduced from Johnson 2012 (website) http:/ jseizingthewhitespace.comjtools-
resourcesjinteractive-models) 
The 4 boxes include the following: 
1) The customer value proposition (CVP)- the "job to be done". 
2) The profits formula, composed of the: 
a. revenue model - offering price x quantity sold 
b. cost structure- determining overhead by requirement of CVP (not taken as a given) 
c. target unit margin (operating profit/unit to achieve profit at a target volume) 
d. resource velocity (how quickly resources need to be used to support target volume) 
3) Key Resources, and: 
4) Key Processes 
The latter two (key resources and key processes) are closely related and are what is needed in 
terms of people, technology, facilities, suppliers, distribution channels, etc. to support the CVP 
to meet the profit formula. 
Johnson (2010) suggests that business rules, norms and success metrics bind these 4 
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boxes together and keeps the system in balance to repeatedly deliver the CVP and fulfill the 
profit formula. It is for these reasons that Johnson suggests that companies can operate very 
efficiently without being able to articulate their business model (i.e. elements of the business 
model can fade in memory, but the rules, norms and metrics persist in the organization and 
culture through the rules, norms and success metrics). 
From the context above, Johnson indicates that new business models are needed 
(business model innovation) when, 
• there is a need to change the current profit formula (particularly related to cost 
structure, resource velocity or both), or 
• the firm must develop many new kinds of resources and processes, or 
• the firm must fundamentally change its core metrics, rules and norms to run the 
business and deliver the CVP. 
Once a firm decides business model innovation is necessary, Johnson (2010) proposes there are 
three different types of business model innovation 
1) Within existing markets ("white space within")- fulfilling important but unsatisfied 
"jobs to be done" (i.e. CVP) for existing customers within existing markets. This also 
relates well to the edge-centric strategy defined by Nunes and Breene (2011) in which 
the periphery of the market is continually scanned to seek untapped customer needs or 
unsolved problems. 
2) Creating new markets ("white space beyond")- democratizing products and services 
and making them accessible to customers who have been shut out of markets. This is 
where existing product and/or service offerings have been too expensive, inaccessible, 
or too complicated. This type of business model innovation is similar to "Blue Oceans" a 
described by Kim and Mauborgne 2004, 2005) 
3) To address industry discontinuities ("white space between") -new opportunities that 
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emerge due to transformational market shift, new technology, or change in government 
policy causing industry upheaval. 
2.2.2 Business Model Innovation and a Constructionist/Post-Positivist View 
Kim and Mauborgne (2004) highlight a very critical point relating to the creation of new 
markets ("Blue Oceans") and, similarly, business model innovation. The traditional belief 
regarding industry conditions and markets is based on a positivist (epistemology) and 
structuralist (ontology) view (i.e. environmental determinism) in which managers of firms 
believe they operate within the constraints of market and economic forces larger then 
themselves. Those firms that create new markets ("Blue Oceans") and undertake business 
model innovation have a post-positivist (epistemology) and constructionist (ontology) view in 
which the managers of these firms believe that market boundaries and industries can be 
redefined by their own actions and beliefs. As opposed to the firm being a more passive 
participant whose activities and future is dictated and constrained by the existing 
markets/industry (i.e. structuralist view), adopting this constructionist belief is a critical aspect 
that enables business model innovation and the firm to take an active role in defining new 
markets/market space and new opportunities. 
2.2.3 Challenges of Business Model Innovation and a Need for Better Understanding 
One of the challenges to business model innovation is that it represents uncertainty (i.e. 
venturing into the unknown) and requires businesses to challenge themselves outside the 
certainty of defined norms (Johnson 2010). The ability to better understand the context of why 
and how businesses undergo business model innovation is key to overcoming some of these 
perceptual barriers. Interestingly, Girotra and Netessine (2011) even describe that risk and 
uncertainty are key factors that can lead to significant opportunities through business model 
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innovation. 
As described by Svejenova eta/. (2010, 409) "Still, little is known about what drives 
business model transformation and the mechanisms through which change occurs". Similarly, 
Teece (2010, 192) has also commented about the" ... paucity of literature (both theoretical and 
practical) on the topic [of business models] as being remarkable given the importance of 
business design, particularly in the context of innovation ... business models are frequently 
mentioned but rarely analyzed: therefore, they are often poorly understood". 
As such, this research project is meant to contribute to a better understanding of the 
processes involved in business model innovation through the examination of a firm that has 
underwent significant transformations in order to innovate its business model. 
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Methodology, Research Strategy and Research Design 
This research project presents a unique opportunity to longitudinally and intensively 
examine and understand the process of business model innovation as it occurred (and is 
occurring) within a firm (Tesera Systems Inc.). In reviewing various research strategies and 
designs (in Bryman eta/. 20 11), the author's philosophy of the research topic of business model 
innovation (oriented towards the intensive longitudinal study of a firm) very much aligns with 
a post-positivist epistemology and a constructionist ontology. In essence, this is the belief that 
people are involved in shaping their social reality, and is very consistent with the author's belief 
that business and business model innovation exists in a socially defined context. As a result, 
this project is based on a qualitative research strategy based on an inductive approach. A case 
study research design best fits the context in which to explore and understand business model 
innovation for the firm. This case study will be an intensive longitudinal study by 
autoethnography (i.e. long-term first hand account of business model innovation). With an 
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autoethnography approach, the focus of the writing style is to create a profound emotional 
experience for the audience such they experience the narrative as if it were happening to them 
(Bryman eta/. 2011, Holman-Jones 2005, Ellis 2004). As such, there is an increased ability for 
the audience to understand the multidimensional context (e.g. cultural, political, financial, 
social, emotional) in which the subject matter evolves (which in this case is how business model 
innovation occurred within the firm). 
The development of the case study has been guided by recent literature on case study 
design (Yin 2009), the use of case studies in business research (e.g. Perran and Ram 2004), and 
actual case study research that relate to the research topic (e.g. Moingeon and Lehmann-Ortega 
2010; Svejenova eta/. 2010; Daganova and Eyquem-Renault 2009, Calia eta/. 2007). The case 
study jautoethnography itself is structured based by the critical periods that influenced changes 
and contributed to business model innovation within the firm. 
3.2 Research Questions 
The questions this research will attempt to address are: 
1) How does the process of business model innovation occur within a company? 
2) What are some of the triggers that contribute to business model innovation and how does 
a company respond to these triggers? 
3) What existing concepts/theories of business model innovation are supported in this case 
study? 
4) What can be learned from this experience of business model innovation retrospectively as 
well as considerations for the future? 
3.3 The Unit of Analysis- The Firm (Tesera Systems Inc.) 
Tesera Systems Inc. is a small privately held natural resource and environmental 
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consulting firm that is focused on using innovative techniques and technologies in helping 
clients to derive better information (to reduce uncertainty and risk) in order to make better 
decisions. The company headquarters are in Cochrane, Alberta (on the outskirts of Calgary). 
The company currently employs 12 staff who are dispersed throughout British Columbia and 
Alberta. Despite this relatively small size, the influence of the company is greater than the 
amount of staff directly employed owing to the current business model. More concisely, the 
company has evolved from what could be called a more traditional, highly competitive-based 
business model to a more contemporary collaborative-based business model. The following 
sections of this chapter will describe critical periods over which this evolution occurred as well 
as reveal the triggers (i.e. "the why") and the response mechanisms ("the how"). 
3.3.1 Period 1: Pre-incorporation - The Genesis of the Firm 
Tesera Systems Inc. was first incorporated as the McGregor Resource Analysis Group. 
The initial naming of the company was to indicate its original subsidiary relationship to the 
McGregor Model Forest (near Prince George, British Columbia). The McGregor Model Forest 
was one of 11 model forests established in Canada in 1992 under the Canadian Model Forest 
Program of the Canadian Forest Service/Natural Resources Canada. Model forests were set up 
to be hands-on laboratories where leading edge techniques for Sustainable Forest Management 
(SFM) could be developed, tested, applied, monitored and shared (MMFA 2001). The McGregor 
Model Forest Association (being a partnership of industry, education, government) was very 
focused on developing and integrating technology to support collaborative decision-making. In 
this regard, a system was developed called "The McGregor Approach to SFM" which 
incorporated scenario planning, computerized tools (for modeling, forecasting and visualizing 
the effects of different forest management scenarios), indicators, monitoring and evaluation 
within a continual improvement/adaptive management framework. This "approach" was very 
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well received to address the newly emerging field of SFM within the forest industry particularly 
as SFM became a driving force to address consumer led demand for forest certification of forest 
products (i.e. proof that forest products were derived from sustainably managed forests). 
The genesis of the company was the result of two primary triggers. The first trigger 
was based upon addressing the needs of the larger forest sector (i.e. forest product companies) 
outside the boundaries of the model forest to provide assurance to its customers that forest 
products were derived from sustainably managed forests (i.e. Forest Certification). The second 
trigger was the desire of the MMFA to become financially self-sl;lfficient as continued long-term 
federal funding of the Model Forest Program was not guaranteed. As a result, the response to 
these triggers was the move to incorporate a for-profit subsidiary company that would deliver 
consulting services to both the MMFA as well as outside clients (e.g. forest 
companies/consortiums, provincial government, etc.). Despite the positive aspects of this 
opportunity, it was also met with criticisms. In particular, other forest consulting companies 
viewed it as being a subsidized competitor. Furthermore, the federal government itself, was 
challenged by the concept of a for-profit entity acting as a funding generating subsidiary with 
the explicit purpose of developing financial self-sufficiency. Despite these criticisms and 
concerns, the McGregor Resource Analysis Group was legally incorporated in 1998 as a for-
profit subsidiary within the non-profit MMFA (MMFA 2001). 
3.3.2 Period 2: Incorporation of the Firm (as a For-Profit Subsidiary) 
The newly incorporated for-profit subsidiary, named the McGregor Resources 
Analysis Group (MRAG), was led and staffed by the previous employees of the MMF A. At 
that time there were 11 employees (including executive staff). The ownership of the 
subsidiary was divided between the MMF A and senior employees/directors (internal and 
external) of the company through an initial private share offering. The organizational chart 
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shown in Figure 2 summarizes the relationship between the MMF A and MRAG. 
As such, the MRAG provided services to the MMFA (to deliver the MMFA program) 
which were previously provided by the employees of the MMFA. In essence, very little changed 
as the same people were delivering the same services for the MFMA program. This included 
consulting services as well as continuation of the software development that supported the 
"McGregor Approach to SFM". The software being developed was spatially explicit landscape 
modeling software that was used to support leading-edge spatially explicit 
McGregor Model Fore1d Auociotion {MMFA} - Organizational Structure 
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Figure 2. Relationship between the MMFA and MRAG (i.e. Tesera Systems Inc.) 
(Reproduced from MMFA 2001, 7) 
resource modeling and analysis. An important point to note was, at the time, there was a lack of 
software available with this capability and part of the early strategy (before the firm was 
established) was to develop the software so it could be licensed and sold. This contributed to 
the ongoing push to develop this software. 
The spatial explicit nature of this software was necessary to be able to show where and 
when activities would occur on the landscape through time relative to one another (e.g. 
harvesting, protected areas, wildlife corridors, recreation areas). This was a very important 
function for not only being able to link strategic planning to operations (and being able to 
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identify management thresholds/limits via indicators), but also to be able to create landscape 
visualizations such that management scenarios over vast areas and long timelines could be 
communicated extremely effectively with stakeholders. The software development was a key 
function in the ability to provide an integrated set of services that was very unique within the 
forestry sector which in turn were very well suited to addressing a new market-based 
requirement (i.e. SFM and subsequently Forest Certification). The ongoing challenge and 
difficulty in this approach was that development of the software and delivery of the services 
was occurring simultaneously. This presented some challenges and difficulties. Since 
software development was "in progress", the scope of what the software needed to address was 
ever expanding. This was partly due to the fact that the concept of SFM was quite new, and 
though there were commonly accepted criteria for SFM, the modeling and analysis of SFM was 
only bounded (or unbounded) by the imagination of those involved. This often created 
difficulties in addressing the balance between a practical representation of reality and striving 
to represent as much detail as possible. 
At the same time, the firm was establishing a presence in developing projects with 
outside clients. In essence, the firm adopted a traditional competitive business model. As such, 
incumbent forest consulting firms that had facilitation, modeling, analytical and geomatics 
capacities were considered competitors and defined the competitive "landscape". Some of the 
projects involved securing work through competitive processes (i.e. request for proposals, 
invitation to tender, etc.) where as other projects resulted from the leading-edge work that was 
conducted with the MMFA. 
Several large projects involved using the "McGregor Approach to SFM". Under the 
approach, the first steps involved worked with stakeholder groups (i.e. public advisory groups) 
to identify a range of management scenarios that they would like to see analyzed on the land 
base. Themes were chosen for these scenarios (e.g. biodiversity, recreation, resource 
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extraction) and then objectives were set for the different themes, and management indicators 
were also identified. This first stage of the process was fairly involved in order to obtain 
information that could then be represented through landscape modeling and analysis (through 
time). Work plans for these projects were established based on certain assumptions and 
timelines. A critical assumption for these projects was that the software development would 
"mature" and stabilize which didn't necessarily occur as envisioned (or assumed). The 
software was required to run on large land bases (> 1 million hectares) and was also designed 
to be platform independent (for the purposes of licensing and selling). As the complexity of the 
software evolved, so too did the computer processing resources required to run the software. 
Fortunately, increased computing processing capabilities could be obtained, though at a 
significant cost. Interestingly, the tendency during this time was not to address the question 
"how much was too much?" with regards to the software development, but instead to keep 
acquiring more processing power to address bottlenecks. Part of the problem was likely that 
this was relatively unknown territory, ari.d that it was very difficult to answer this question. 
The other factor to consider was that the software development was a "cornerstone" of the 
MMFA. It was a distinguishing element amongst the entire Model Forest Network. Continued 
development was considered progress and budgets were allocated for continued development 
of the software under the Model Forest program. As such, the legacy of software development 
was a strong driver for continued software development. 
3.3.3 Period 3: An Independent Firm- Tesera Systems Inc. 
The earlier concerns and criticisms of establishing a for-profit subsidiary company 
continued to grow after the MRAG had been incorporated and started conducting projects. 
Despite being established to meet financial self-sustainability objectives for the anticipated 
reduction in federal funding support (i.e. CFS/NRCAN), it was clear that this type of relationship 
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was not what was expected (nor encouraged) as part of the Model Forest program. This was a 
particularly important consideration since the Canadian Model Forest Program was ending its 
second 5-year phase, and entertaining proposals for a third 5-year phase. In recognizing the 
incompatibility and difficulty this presented for the continuation of the McGregor Model Forest, 
it was determined that the best solution moving forward was to sever the subsidiary 
relationship between the MMFA and the MRAG (known by that time as the McGregor Group). 
As a result, an agreement was formed to enable the firm to repurchase the MMFA shares as well 
as an agreement regarding the status and ownership of the developed technology (e.g. 
computer models, software, etc.). It is important to note that this move to sever the link 
between the MMFA and MRAG resulted MRAG inheriting the burden of the administrative and 
R&D structure that was initially linked the MMFA. 
To further clarify this independence from the MMFA, the McGregor Group changed the 
name of the firm to Tesera Systems Inc. A "tesera" is a small tile within a mosaic. As such, the 
concept of the "small pieces that make up the big picture" was particularly appropriate to the 
nature of the work the company was involved with. "Systems" was added to reflect the "high 
tech" nature of the work as well as the integrated approach that was developed for SFM (which 
was later rebranded as the "Tesera Approach to Sustainable Resource Management"). Tesera 
Systems also physically separated from the MMFA in moving to a new head office location (until 
this time, a majority of the employees shared common office space with the MMFA). From a 
broad perspective, each organization was enabled to pursue its endeavors independent of one 
another. 
Shortly after this formal separation from the MMFA, a second share offering was 
extended to all the employees of the company (at this time there were 18 employees). One of 
the intentions of this share offering was to encourage a sense of ownership within all the 
employees ofTesera. From an equity perspective, the share offering to employees didn't have 
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an effect in raising capital but rather reduced accrued overtime liabilities (since many shares 
purchased by employees were conducted through accrued overtime reductions). A large 
portion of employees accepted the share offers (i.e. total of 17 shareholders). 
Even through the direct service support (by Tesera) for the McGregor Model Forest 
program discontinued under this agreement, many of the large external projects continued (as 
well as a number of other smaller contracts). Several of the large projects were based upon a 
consortium approach where a group of forest companies (including government) would 
collectively develop SFM plans over large land base units known as timber supply areas 
(hundreds of thousands to millions of hectares in size). The primary source of funding to 
conduct this work was through provincial stumpage revenues that were administered through 
a provincial program called Forest Renewal BC (FRBC). Several initiatives were established 
with the province to address alternative ways of conducting forest management such as the 
Innovative Forest Practices Agreement (IFPA), and the Enhanced Forest Management Pilot 
Projects (EFMPP). In addition, the company was also involved in resource analysis work as 
part of the provincial Timber Supply Review (TSR) process. 
In order to meet the timelines and commitments to deliver on these projects (i.e. multi 
million dollar contracts), the company embarked upon a growth phase. This required both an 
increase in the human resources as well as computing hardware and software development 
resources (to address the delivery /development issue described earlier). The capital needed to 
support this growth phase was obtained through Government of Canada business improvement 
loans (BILs). These were government secured loans to support capital improvements for 
companies. For the most part, this supported the acquisition of a series of high powered 
computer processers, servers, storage and communication devices. From a human resources 
perspective, Tesera's staff increased to approximately 25 people to support the project 
workload and timely delivery according to the project work plans. At that time (2001), a large 
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proportion of the staff worked centrally from the head office (Prince George), with the 
exception of two staff members, one who had always worked remotely from northwest BC, and 
one staff who just relocated to Calgary, Alberta (primarily due to a spouse's relocation but also 
represented an opportunity to diversify geographically). 
As mentioned above, a significant amount of work continued on the initial phases of 
these large projects which involved a tremendous amount of public involvement work, and a 
significant amount of data collection/processing to prepare for the analysis phases. As such, 
there was an ample amount of work to keep staff busy and billable. At that time, the revenue 
model for the business was essentially based on professional services, such that greater 
revenues were generated by hiring more people. Additional elements to this revenue model 
were also put in place to offset computing costs (i.e. CPU time), and well as cost recovery of 
software development (i.e. a charge per hectare for the application of the modeling software). 
These revenue model elements were negotiated into the initial project contracts. With many of 
the project staff fully utilized, the company performed quite well financially. 
3.3.4 Period 4: The Perfect Storm 
Despite the growth, the level of activity on projects and the favorable financial situation 
of the company, some of the initial internal challenges continued to persist. Again, these were 
related to the issues of continually increasing complexity /scope of the projects as a result of the 
software being in a continual development phase. Preliminary analysis and model runs 
required fixes of the software bugs (which were anticipated) and also issues related to 
processing capacity; however, the assumptions related to project timelines were perhaps 
overly optimistic given this uncertainty related to development. These factors led to awkward 
relationships with clients who were justifiably concerned with the timelines (particularly due 
to subsequent commitments that were made to their organizations). Fortunately, many of the 
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clients recognized the benefits offered by this approach and the unique aspects of the tools that 
were being developed (i.e. spatially explicit landscape and resource modeling) and some 
flexibility was negotiated. 
In addition to these internal factors, several external factors emerged at that time which 
transformed the forest sector. The Canada/US softwood lumber dispute was escalating, and 
the various back and forth challenges in this dispute resulted in increasing costs to lumber 
producers. In May 2002 the United States imposed a 27 percent duty on Canadian softwood 
lumber (pine, spruce and fir) (CBC 2006). These were the primary forest products produced by 
our clients. The forestry sector responded by increasing efficiencies of mills and there was also 
significant consolidation within the industry such that numerous independent forest product 
companies were being acquired by multinational companies (e.g. Canfor, Weyerhauser, West 
Fraser). 
The BC mountain pine beetle epidemic was another emerging crisis that directly 
affected many ofTesera's clients particularly in the western part of the province (Morice and 
Lakes Timber Supply Areas) but also in the eastern parts of central BC (Robson Valley Timber 
Supply Area). Mature pine stands were completely devastated by the mountain pine beetle and 
quite often these pine stands were a very high percentage of the available timber in these areas 
for near term timber supply. 
Perhaps the most devastating external factor that had the most severe consequences to 
Tesera was the 2001 BC provincial election which resulted in a change in provincial political 
parties from the New Democratic Party (NDP) to the Liberal Party. Amongst a number of fiscal 
austerity measures brought in by the newly elected Liberal government, was a termination of 
the NDP initiated FRBC program which provided core funding of many ofTesera's large 
projects. As noted earlier, Tesera had recently signed contracts for these large projects which 
required the investment in human and capital resources to service the needs of these projects. 
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In October 2001, the Provincial Government officially provided notice to FRBC to cease 
operations on March 31,2002 (FRBC 2002). The government announced that FRBC would be 
replaced with a more efficient program. There was, however, a significant lag between the 
announcement of the termination of the FRBC program and the eventual establishment of the 
replacement program. As such, contracts for projects that were developed under the FRBC 
program were cancelled. Tesera had made large investments in capital and human resources 
without a critical source of revenue to support these commitments. Though FRBC was replaced 
with a new program called the Forest Investment Account (FIA), there was a significant lag and 
period of uncertainty. As such, when projects were reinitiated under the FIA program, 
contracts were renegotiated under reduced funding resources of which some of the elements of 
the previous revenue model were not accepted. Essentially, the revenue model was strictly for 
services (and not reflective of computing costs nor was cost recovery for software model 
development via a per hectare rate). 
The response by Tesera to this situation was to increase its effort in pursuing other 
forest consulting work. With many forestry consulting companies in the same situation, it was 
a "buyers' market". The environment had become ultra-competitive and it was quite evident 
the unwritten strategy of many firms was to underbid in order to get projects. This effect led to 
many forestry consulting companies going out of business and for those remaining, the 
competition had the effect of commoditizing forestry consulting services, and depressing 
consulting rates (i.e. known in the industry as the "race to the bottom"). 
This response led to an unfocused approach to business development. Tesera expended 
significant efforts to respond to request for proposals (RFPs) and invitations to tender (ITT) 
which might only have the slightest relationship to the types of services offered by Tesera. In 
essence, Tesera adopted a desperate strategy of trying to be "everything to everyone at any 
price". This was extremely time intensive and the success rate was minimal. Projects which 
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were successful through these efforts were generally at low (or negative) margins. 
Additional efforts were made to diversify into different geographic markets/sectors. 
The author relocated to Southern Alberta in 2001 followed by the then Vice President in 2002 
and shortly after by 4 staff members (existing and new). The President relocated to Southern 
Alberta in 2003. With both the President and Vice President having relocated to Southern 
Alberta, the location of the corporate headquarters was officially moved to Cochrane, Alberta, 
with the office in Prince George now considered a branch office 
During this period, the culture and morale of the organization was negatively impacted. 
Senior employees who sat on the board resigned their board positions (that were filled by 
newer employees). Employees who remained in the Prince George office openly expressed a 
feeling of abandonment. Several employees left the organization, and several support staff 
were laid off (with the majority departing between May- Nov 2004). As time progressed, the 
two principals (President and the prior Vice President) of the firm took a voluntary layoff and 
the remaining employees agreed to payroll deferral in order to address financial challenges. 
The organization was essentially on life support with liabilities accumulating and debt 
payments were deferred, being paid as late as possible. Both the President and Vice President 
continued to work for the company in a reduced capacity though the Vice President took 
another job (which further reduced his involvement). In addition, during this time a key senior 
manager also resigned. Shortly after, the Vice President, eventually resigned from both the 
executive position and as an officer of the board. 
In what was seemingly a devastating impact to the company with the departure of key 
individuals, a request was made of specific existing staff to step into these key roles. The senior 
resource analyst role was filled by a newly hired recruit who had a similar role in his previous 
employ. The author of this paper was asked to take on the roles and responsibilities of the 
recently departed Vice President/Corporate Treasurer (a daunting task with having no formal 
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business education/experience, but having the key qualification of being "conscientious" as 
explained by the President of the company). 
3.3.5 Period 5: Survival Mode 
In retrospect, this lack of formal business knowledge was not such a detriment since 
there was no preconceived notion of the level of despair of the situation, nor was there a sense 
that it couldn't be fixed. There was a tremendous learning curve involved in assuming the roles 
and responsibilities of the recently departed Vice President. The beginning of this learning 
curve really marked the early stages of business model innovation in the company. This was 
applicable both for developing and understanding of business principles as well as 
understanding the status of the company itself (financially, culturally, etc.). With regards to the 
former, several resources to understand business principles were involved. Learning was 
gained from many contemporary books on business in such areas as leadership, strategy, 
culture, etc. (e.g. Collins 2001, Moore 1999, Burlingham 2005, Kim and Mauborgne 2005, 
Goleman 2003, Michelli 2007, Grescoe 2004). These contemporary business books provided a 
tremendous resource to learn from the experience of other companies and to be able to 
incorporate contemporary and innovative ideas into Tesera. Another important opportunity 
(in terms of defining the openness to learn from the experience of other businesses) came 
about with the participation in a group called CETAC West. This organization was developed to 
assist entrepreneurs of environmental technology companies in developing their products and 
services through things such as mentoring, advisory boards, and workshops with other 
participating companies. 
The process of being exposed to the experiences shared by other businesses (e.g. 
challenges, issues) through the books and workshops (described above) brought about a 
profound realization: the issues and challenges that we were experiencing as a company were 
21 
general business issues and challenges, and not specific to what services we delivered or 
products we sold. It was very liberating to recognize this fact since the business experiences 
(challenges, solutions) gained from others could contribute to the gap of my own personal 
business experience. This realization was fundamental to the immense value in sharing, 
listening to and learning from the business experience of others (i.e. personal accounts, books, 
articles, etc.). 
The initial period of assuming the roles and responsibilities of the recently departed 
Vice President could be best described as a financial triage situation. The principle that was 
adopted was to keep things as simple as possible so that all involved (managers, company 
board) could understand the situation. 
Much of the previous bookkeeping and day-to-day accounting activity had been 
conducted internally (i.e. internal bookkeeper /accountant, VP). It was openly expressed by 
other members of the board that there was very little understanding of the financial details. In 
moving forward, and following the "keep it simple" principle, the bookkeeping and accounting 
functions were outsourced. This helped contribute to greater financial clarity since the 
bookkeeper and accountant were now considered as external advisors with no vested interest 
in the financial results of the company. 
The primary issue to address in this phase was a highly complex backlog of short-term 
financial liabilities that were in various stages of delayed payment. This not only required 
significant time to manage the complexity, but also incurred significant financing costs as well 
as risking the continuity of services to our firm. Again, one of the first steps was to simplify this 
process, and develop a system for the timely payment of short-term liabilities. 
Another financial issue that emerged involved our long-term debt instruments (i.e. 
Business Improvement Loans). As mentioned previously, the BILs were used to purchase 
computer hardware (i.e. rapidly depreciating assets) to meet the growing processing demands 
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of the software that was being developing. The bank administering the B!Ls recognized there 
was a key change in management and an effective change in company ownership (with 
departing employees shareholders). As such, the bank became increasingly interested in the 
financial status of the company. The maintenance of key covenants were required for the B!Ls 
but were not actively monitored by the company nor by the bank (other than by submission of 
year end financial statements). As a response to the bank's concerns, the company immediately 
implemented the use of several financial ratios (established in consultation with our external 
bookkeeper). Furthermore, regular monthly financial reporting was initiated in order to 
provide the input to generate the financial ratios on a monthly basis. This measure provided 
both transparency and clarity of financial performance for both internal purposes (board of 
directors) and external purposes (bank). This was the start of a greater understanding of the 
financial status of the company, and provided an ability to develop a strategy to manage the 
liabilities of the company 
Another financial liability emerged for the company in the form of exiting shareholders. 
As mentioned above, there were several employees who either left the company, or were laid 
off. A shareholders agreement was established when the company was first incorporated, and 
one of the conditions to own company shares was the requirement to be an employee or 
director of the company. Under the shareholders agreement, the company was required to buy 
back the shares starting 6 months after the date of departure (with provisions to schedule 
payments over a period of 5 years with interest). At that time, nine previous employee 
shareholders (almost half being major shareholders) required their shares to be repurchased 
by the company. At that time, this repurchase requirement represented 52% of the issued 
shares. 
In adhering to the "keep it simple" principle, another informal corporate principle 
emerged arising from this shareholder situation. The principle of consistency was used to 
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navigate through this issue of shareholder buyback negotiations. The share price calculation 
was developed through a series of formulas such that it would consider multiple of earnings 
(projections), book value, and factor of sales. Even though the share price applicable to many 
of the exiting shareholders was based on highly optimistic projections (that were not reflective 
of the financial situation of the day), it was decided that the company would adhere to 
consistency of the share price determination process. Despite a long negotiation process (of 
which share price was the largest issue), all previous shareholders eventually settled based on 
the calculated price. Through this process, the company has recognized the value of 
consistency in share price determination, and has consistently used the same process to this 
day. 
3.3.6 Period 6: Establishing "Pillars" for Recovery 
In "Survival Mode", there was a steep learning curve, but perhaps the most important 
thing, was the immense opportunity to critically examine and learn about the key elements of 
our business (i.e. what we did, why we did it, how we did it, and if it made sense). As per Peter 
Drucker's Theory of the Business (1996), this was where we asked ourselves if "the story of our 
business" still made sense. 
The financial survival of the company was obviously of critical importance. In survival 
mode, the financial management related to dealing with the internal financial crisis was all 
consuming and an incredible distraction to the actual work the company excelled at (i.e. core 
competencies). As such, the most important lesson learned was to never put our company in 
that position again. Through this experience, the burden of debt was immense, and this 
experience very much shaped and influenced the evolution of the company's business model. 
In survival mode, we became a very financially lean company (out of necessity). In 
evolving into a recovery mode, we continued to recognize the value of being lean but we also 
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recognized that investments that we made as a company had to be smart. In staying with our 
"keep it simple" philosophy, we established 4 "pillars" for recovery (ceremoniously written on a 
piece of scrap paper which still sits prominently on the author's desk as a reminder). 
1. Aggressively reduce debt- with the top priority being the elimination of the 
Business Improvement Loans (BILs). Contrary to their name, these loans were actually 
reducing our ability to improve as a business (due to several factors both external and 
internal). As such, eliminating the BILs was paramount, but reducing all debt and 
liabilities was a fundamental principal. 
2. Invest in the company- providing the staff with the tools they needed to do their jobs 
efficiently and effectively. Previous fiscal cuts (e.g. not investing in proper hardware and 
software upgrades and maintenance) resulted in staff performing workarounds or 
spending much more time on work than was technically necessary. This was not only 
more time consuming, but also frustrating to the employees. 
3. Invest in the employees - Providing competitive salaries and benefits was the 
industry status quo, but Tesera needed to look to innovative ways to incorporating things 
that would establish a culture and a sense of belonging. A key part to building the culture 
within the company was to strengthen those things that were important to employees but 
were not related to regular salaries/benefits. A primary focus was on things that would 
contribute to a better work/life balance. For example, flexible working hours were 
already in place, but the company also embraced virtual working environments, and 
provided the option to all staff to work from a home office. Other programs were also 
developed to nurture the development of a corporate culture. This included company 
supported initiatives to encourage personal development (i.e. self-directed opportunities 
based on personal interests), and company supported initiatives encouraging active 
involvement in community (i.e. employee directed corporate donation programs to 
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chartable organizations that they are involved in). 
4. Invest in shareholders- Normally shareholders are at the top of the priority list; 
however, without the other "support" of these other pillars, being a shareholder in a 
bankrupt company would be meaningless. Up to this point, the shareholders of the 
company had not been paid dividends, but the importance of this pillar recognized the 
patience and fortitude of the shareholders and a commitment to build company equity in 
order to pay shareholders future dividends. 
To our surprise and delight, these 4 simple principles invigorated and energized the company. 
They were a "call to action" and provided us with a sense that we were not victims of 
circumstance, but instead we were now in control of our destiny. 
Another key turning point in this recovery phase focused on the future of our software 
development. The amount of effort and resources that were being expended to continually 
develop the software was significant. In essence, we continued to develop software because 
that is what we did from the beginning (a legacy from our past); however, it was never really 
critically questioned. As noted earlier, the intent from the initial establishment of the company 
was to be able to "package and sell" the software to the outside world. The biggest problem 
was that the outside world had changed considerably. The potential customers had changed 
significantly. Forest consulting firms were dramatically reduced, and forest companies had 
significantly consolidated. Furthermore, a commercially available software solution had 
emerged as an industry standard (albeit with lesser capability in some regards). In order to 
understand how best to proceed with the software, a key resource was the book "Crossing the 
Chasm: marketing and selling disruptive products to mainstream customers" (Moore 1991). The 
software that we had developed was clearly a disruptive product with the purpose of gaining 
market share and displacing an industry standard product. The book used the analogy of the 
D-day invasion, with the first critical phase of amassing all your resources to gain a "beachhead" 
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in the target market. But the critical question early in the book was does your company have 
the depth of resources to secure a beachhead? This question brought about a critical 
realization. Our company was not in a position to mount the resources to challenge the 
industry standard. With this understanding, came an alternative idea. Rather than trying to 
compete with an industry standard, an effective strategy would to build linkages between the 
industry standard software and our software. In essence, our approach would be more 
collaborative and recognize/leverage the strengths of each. As such, the greater we were able 
to build compatibility with the industry standard software, the more likely we would be able to 
turn the clients of the industry standard software into our clients. This was the beginning of 
Tesera recognizing the virtues of a "collaborative" business model in which we would focus on 
what we did best, and look to collaborate with others on what they did best; thereby creating 
mutual benefits. 
3.3.7 Period 7: The Development of the Collaborative Business Model 
This change in philosophy (i.e. collaborative approach) very much resonated with the 
company. In part, due to the fact we were very lean, it made sense to focus on our core 
competencies and to work with other like-minded companies who specialized in 
complimentary services (focusing on what they did best). As such, relationship building was a 
key aspect of this collaborative approach, which again, resonated with the nature of our small 
company. 
The other large influence in developing this collaborative business model, was a book 
called "Small Giants: Companies that Choose to Be Great Instead of Big" (Burlingham 2005). 
This book provided inspiration and confidence that there were alternative ways to develop our 
company than our previous approach. The approach of focusing to develop a great company, 
rather than specifically looking to grow in number of people (i.e. the previous approach of 
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Tesera), fit very well with the new collaborative approach we were looking to develop. This 
was also reinforced by the book Good to Great (Collins 2001). 
Another very influential book that contributed to the development of our collaborative 
approach was the Blue Ocean Strategy: How To Create Uncontested Market Space And Make The 
Competition Irrelevant (Kim and Mauborgne 2005). The Blue Ocean Strategy was very 
instrumental in allowing us to think very differently about how we pursued opportunities. 
Again this fit very well with the collaborative approach. A very influential aspect to this was 
the process of identifying what were "healthy opportunities" for us as a company. This helped 
us identify the importance of developing relationship-based opportunities with clients that 
would value quality and proactive value-added solutions. The building of relationships with 
potential clients was the key to establishing trust and developing proactive solutions and 
actually creating opportunities (i.e. uncontested market space or "Blue Oceans"). This 
relationship-based approach provided a tremendous incentive for us to proactively develop 
solutions in our clients best interest and greatly contributed to long-term sustainability (i.e. 
long-term customer relationships). In essence, this provided us the focus to determine which 
opportunities were "healthy" for us as a company, and which ones were not. As mentioned 
earlier, we traditionally pursued business opportunities through passive means (i.e. RFP, ITT, 
ITQ processes). These were primarily government-related projects with the criteria heavily 
weighted to lowest cost with little regard to quality or value-added. It became very clear 
through this process that government related projects didn't align with the collaborative 
business model we were developing since focus of this approach was relationship-based, 
oriented on the long-term interests of the client. As the government projects were based on 
low-cost, short-term commitments, they were not conducive to a relationship-based approach 
that involved upfront investment in client relationships, proactively seeking value-added 
opportunities, and seeking long-term solutions for the client. In effect, we essentially 
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discontinued pursuing government projects and focused exclusively on building relationship 
with clients that aligned well with our collaborative approach. 
This sharpened focus of pursuing opportunities through building long-term 
relationships with clients, provided a new enthusiasm. Rather than our employees spending 
large amounts of time pursuing passive opportunities which were highly competitive and low 
margins (e.g. Government RFPs), we asked staff to take a different perspective of business 
development. This new perspective was to focus on actively developing the opportunities (i.e. 
non-competitive) by identifying clients with whom we could build long-term relationships. 
These are clients who place a high importance on being exposed to value-added, proactive 
solutions for their long-term benefit. This approach focused on getting actively involved with 
various groups, communities of interest, companies, etc. to identify potential clients, and how 
we could help to alleviate the "pain" they were experiencing. The key to building these 
relationships was listening first, and engaging in a two-way dialogue to identify how we could 
help. Pursuing this type of client provided us the unique ability and incentive to continually 
look for solutions in our clients' best interest (i.e. investing in our clients' interests so that they 
would invest in us for the long-term). This allowed us to tap into our innovative nature that 
had been suppressed in the existing approach to business development (competitive process). 
3.3.8 Period 8: The Implementation of the Collaborative Business Model (the 
breakthrough) 
The different approach that developed from the collaborative business model resonated 
well with other like-minded companies, and we worked to build the relationships to develop 
this network of companies with complementary resources and capabilities. Building these 
relationships not only yielded immediate opportunities (e.g. Tesera contributing expertise on 
existing projects for other companies), but also it led to strategic discussions of opportunities 
that could be pursued using this type of collaborative business model. In a very short period of 
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time (late 2005), an opportunity arose from one of the key collaborative companies to pursue a 
high profile Environmental Impact Assessment in Southern Alberta for EnCana Corporation (a 
prominent oil and gas producer and one of the largest corporations in Canada). Due to the 
nature of this project, there were specific "hot buttons" that needed to be addressed, and key 
expertise on the team would be a major selling point (as it was very likely this project would go 
to hearings). The collaborative business model provided us with a distinct advantage. It 
provided the ability to "cherry pick" the best expertise to best meet the needs of the project (as 
opposed to a large company who would be compelled to put forth internal resources first). In 
response to this opportunity, Tesera put together a collaborative team of specialists consisting 
of 13 companies (ranging from individual consultants to multinational companies). Through a 
competitive process with two other industry leaders (both which were incumbent service 
providers to EnCana), our collaborative team approach was awarded the EIA project. This 
project was the first of its kind for our company in many ways (i.e. scale, scope) and really 
demonstrated the virtues of the collaborative business model which included: 
1) The ability to assemble resource and capabilities extremely quickly -this occurred 
within days, rather than the traditional approach of having to hire staff. 
2) The ability to "cherry pick" the best expertise for a particular project (linking to critical 
aspects of the project and being a game-changer for being awarded the project) 
3) Enabling the experts to excel at what they do best. This meant that technical experts did 
not have to do the job of project management (which was instead done by project 
management experts). 
4) Minimal capital requirements- the collaborative partners were sub-consultants and 
paid as the work proceeded through the project. This was in contrast to our previously 
business model where Tesera hired internally to service projects (requiring substantial 
capital requirements and risk). 
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5) Transformational-based relationship with collaborative partners- it was recognized 
early in this project, that there had to be more than just a transactional-based 
relationship with the collaborative partners. As such, it was very important to develop a 
culture within the project team that provided a greater connection to one another. The 
clients (EnCana) also explicitly built-in team building events into the project. 
6) Being able to adjust resources very quickly throughout the project, and to ramp down 
resources very quickly at the end of the project. Often when large projects end, the 
abrupt change in workflow can have a dramatic impact on a company that needs to fill 
the void to keep valued employees and if it can't, these employees may leave (i.e. lay-off, 
resign). This collaborative approach is much better oriented towards these types of 
projects since each company has not necessarily "staffed up" but rather is contributing 
existing resources and expertise in a manner that is much more sustainable to its 
existing and future operations (without dramatic fluctuations). 
7) Building long-term working relationships with collaborative partners (as well as clients) 
This particular project, with its large scale and complexity also revealed a number of 
considerations with this collaborative approach. 
1) Effective and efficient leadership and project management are paramount. The primary 
benefit of this approach is that it allows the experts the ability to excel at what they do 
best while ensuring that everyone can benefit from all others in the team in meeting the 
objectives of the project and the client. 
2) Cohesion and positive culture amongst the team is an extremely important "asset" to 
develop, nurture, monitor and manage. The principle is that the whole is greater than 
the sum of the parts, and that this requires active management. 
3) Cash flow management needs to be carefully considered and planned - in this project, 
timely payment of the sub-consultants (less than 30 days) was a key benefit to positive 
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relationships/culture. The payment conditions that were negotiated with the client 
from the outset of the project (and an electronic payment system) greatly facilitated 
effective cash flow management. 
4) Proactive and highly responsive communications with the client and the sub-consultants 
-Dealing with any contentious issues proactively and expeditiously (no matter how 
painful) was the most effective way to ensure problems could be addressed and 
managed such that the project could continually move forward. This open dialogue 
helped to build trust and understanding amongst the team. 
The above project lasted 2 1!z years with a multimillion-dollar budget, and did proceed to joint 
review panel hearings. 
3.3.9 Period 9: The Growth and Evolution of the Collaborative Business Model 
Based on the success and learning from the above implementation and large scale 
application of the collaborative business model, Tesera has further applied and evolved the 
collaborative business model for other large projects and also within Tesera (i.e. internal 
services, development, information technology [IT]). The sections below describe how the 
collaborative business model has grown and evolved with respect to how Tesera pursues 
projects (and develops relationship with clients and other collaborative companies) and how it 
has contributed to influencing the internal improvements in our company. 
3.3.9.1 Criteria for Assessing/Developing Opportunities 
With regards to projects, based on the nature of the collaborative business model (and 
learning from our experience from previous projects), Tesera has developed principles and 
criteria for developing/identifying opportunities that best optimize the collaborative business 
model in terms of: 
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1) building long-term relationships with clients, 
2) enhancing the collaborative network, 
3) optimizing internal resources to foster collaboration, and 
4) optimize revenue generation. 
The disciplined application of these principles and criteria have enabled Tesera to be even 
more highly focused toward developing the types of opportunities that are most "healthy" for 
our company and contribute to strengthening our business model. This approach has resulted 
in much greater efficiency and effectiveness in determining which opportunities to pursue and 
which opportunities not to pursue. 
3.3.9.2 Internal Improvements to Information Technology Management 
Tesera has also looked internally to evaluate ways that the principles of the 
collaborative business model may provide benefits. One of the key aspects of our business is 
the use and analysis/modeling of large amount of digital data and information. This requires a 
significant investment in computing resources both in terms of processing capabilities and 
storage capacity and the maintenance of the IT infrastructure. The approach to this 
requirement in the past was to continually acquire the computing hardware that would meet 
the peak (or near peak) computing needs. The IT infrastructure was managed informally with 
internal staff (whose primary job was not IT). 
When applying the principles of a collaborative business model to this internal 
situation, the key recognition is that by managing the IT infrastructure internally, it was 
reducing our ability to do what we did best which was actually using the IT infrastructure for 
innovative solutions (not managing and maintaining it). The first step in this process was to 
collaborate with a company that specialized in IT management/maintenance. This solution 
brought much greater efficiency to this issue of IT management and maintenance, while at the 
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same time allowed us to focus on those things which we excelled at (and generated revenue 
by). 
3.3.9.3 Migration to Cloud Computing 
The second phase of this process was looking at the IT hardware itself (i.e. the IT 
assets). As cloud computing was just emerging as a service-based solution, Tesera examined 
this alternative solution to meet our fluctuating computing needs. Cloud computing fit the 
collaborative based business model very well. It allowed us to engage other companies who 
specialized in building/maintaining/securing/improving IT infrastructure while at the same 
time being able to access unlimited processing and storage capacities on demand. This fit the 
needs of our projects very well where often we would need peak computing resources 
periodically, and cloud computing provided the ability to accommodate these situations 
perfectly, and thus only pay for these resources when needed. This ability to quickly ramp up 
and retract computing resources via cloud computing was very similar to the benefits of our 
collaborative business model (and contributed to our "Small Giants" philosophy /approach). 
3.3.9.4 The Adoption of the Virtual Office Environment 
Another initiative that contributed to the evolution of our collaborative business model 
was the adoption of the virtual office environment. This initiative started relatively modestly 
and very situation specific. Initially, it was used as a means to accommodate individual 
employees in terms of attracting talented employees (and enable them to work from their 
current location), or to retain talented employees that had to relocate for personal reasons (i.e. 
spouse's work) that would still enable them to continue to work for the company. This modest 
approach allowed our company to adapt gradually to the concept of virtual office environments. 
Initially, there were only a few employees in the company working virtually and it was fairly 
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easy to make adjustments to overcome many of the challenges, particularly as technology 
evolved quickly to help address both technical limitations (internet speeds/bandwidth) and to 
some degree address social related challenges (e.g. remote computing, virtual collaboration 
tools, instant messaging (IM), voice-over-IP /Skype). In 2008, Tesera provided the option for 
all employees to work virtually from their home offices in order to provide better work-life 
balance opportunities. As a result, even though the company owns a physical office space for its 
head office, today all ofTesera's employees are working from their home offices. 
The virtual office environment has provided significant benefits that contribute to 
Tesera's objective of improving benefits to employees while also aligning very well with 
Tesera's collaborative business model. For example, from an internal benefits perspective, staff 
commuting is greatly reduced but their ability to work virtually in many different locations via 
technology from their virtual office space is unbounded. A substantial amount of internal staff 
meetings are conducted electronically (via Skype, WebEx, JoinMe GoogleDocs) with staff 
located in several different cities (as well as being able to accommodate them when they are 
away from their home office). Client meetings are also conducted more and more using similar 
tools, and, as such, it greatly reduces travel costs and time both for our clients and our staff. In 
essence, the virtual office environment has diminished barriers related to physical location 
and/or distance. The migration to a virtual workspace has resulted in a greater ability for our 
staff to work collaboratively with others (i.e. other staff mem hers, collaborative companies, or 
clients) regardless of whether they are located in the same city or on the other side of the 
world. 
3.3.9.5 Demonstrated Resilience of the Collaborative Business Model 
Perhaps one of the most satisfying achievements of the collaborative business model is 
that it has demonstrated the resilience that the company had been looking for (so as not to 
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repeat the near-death experience again). Surprisingly, the first test of the resiliency of the 
collaborative business model occurred in an extreme period of growth (2006- 2007) in our 
local market (Southern Alberta). During this time, there were shortages of skilled employees 
and companies were experiencing severe problems of employee retention (i.e. employees were 
being lured from one company to another). Fortunately, with the measures put in place to 
address employees' broader set of needs (flexibility, life balance, etc.), Tesera was able to avoid 
any loss of employees to other firms during this extremely competitive period. 
The second test of resiliency of our collaborative business model was the economic 
downturn of 2008. As discussed earlier, Tesera specifically developed the collaborative 
business model to prepare for this type of situation. As such, with a collaborative business 
model, the company was well-prepared to weather the storm organizationally, financially and 
mentally (i.e. by having been through this before, and having designed the collaborative 
business model to accommodate these kinds of situations). As such, Tesera was well-
positioned to use the downturn as an advantage. During the economic downturn that persisted 
through to March 2009, Tesera didn't have contracts cancelled, though some new projects were 
delayed. Tesera actively used this downturn time as an opportunity to improve internal 
systems, increase business development efforts, and actually hire new people. As such, once 
the economic crisis eased and projects came online (April 2009), Tesera was poised perfectly to 
accommodate the sudden increase in work, which again, was a function and a benefit of the 
collaborative business model. 
Perhaps the most unexpected aspect to this demonstrated resilience of the collaborative 
business model was that these extreme situations of rapid growth and rapid economic decline 
(followed by rapid growth) occurred right after one another, and the collaborative business 
model excelled in accommodating these rapid and dramatic changes. 
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3.3.9.6 Horizontal Integration by Collaboration 
In a similar nature to how Tesera looked toward collaboration as a principle for 
business model innovation, the company is also looking to implement a similar approach to 
other business processes (in which collaboration can achieve a similar outcome, but also have 
additional benefits). 
In particular, horizontal integration is commonly accomplished through merger and 
acquisitions. One of the common purposes of horizontal integration is to enter new geographic 
markets (through acquiring firms that already have a presence). Horizontal integration 
through acquisitions/mergers can involve significantly large and complex financial 
transactions, thereby making it difficult for small companies to participate in the benefits of 
horizontal integration. 
An alternative approach that Tesera is working to implement is horizontal integration 
by collaboration (following the principles of the collaborative business model). In essence, the 
specific purpose of this approach is to access new geographic markets. The symbiotic benefit to 
collaborative companies is the extension of the value chain of each company (i.e. either upward 
or downward) and providing the opportunity for each firm to operate in new geographic 
markets. The advantage to this type of collaborative approach is that it allows each firm access 
into new geographic markets with a collaborative company that is already operating in those 
markets (lowering the risk of doing business in a new country), without the capital 
requirements/complexity of mergers and acquisitions (even further lowering the risk from a 
financial perspective). This application of the collaborative business model for horizontal 
integration is a further innovation to the business model, since the existing applications were 
oriented to serving the needs of clients and projects domestically, whereas this approach is 
specifically oriented toward opening new geographic markets. 
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4 Discussion/Results 
Just as Tesera has been influenced and inspired by the stories and experience of others, 
it is anticipated that the experiences toward business model innovation revealed in this 
autoethnography will resonate with other practitioners and firms, and provide some insight 
into the motivations, triggers and responses toward business model innovation. This 
autoethnography of Tesera provides insight and context (social, financial, political, emotional, 
etc.) into the process involved in business model innovation. In addition, this retrospective 
analysis of business model innovation within the firm is expected to stimulate further business 
model innovation into the future. 
4.1 Synopsis Business Model Innovation process with Tesera 
One of the key things to recognize is that the concept of business model innovation was 
not known to Tesera until very recently. As a company, all the processes described in the 
autoethnography occurred organically and were guided by significant events and influences (i.e. 
triggers). There was, however, a clear recognition from the outset of changing to a new 
business model that the company was doing things differently (and we were aware of the 
general concept of business models); however, it wasn't until being exposed to the business 
model innovation concept within this MBA program, that it was recognized that Tesera had 
gone through the experience and process of business model innovation. 
With this recognition (and information associated with business model innovation) 
came a greater understanding of the processes that the company experienced. It helped to put 
into perspective and value the experiences (good and bad) that the company went through. 
For Tesera, the process of business model innovation very much started in response to a 
very critical event (i.e. near-bankruptcy) and at the time was viewed more as a life-saving 
measure, than a business model innovation opportunity. In essence, the company had to 
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dramatically change the way it did business or else it would have ceased to exist. The transition 
to a new way of doing business was greatly facilitated by a change of personnel in a key 
leadership position (that wasn't bounded by traditional views of how to conduct business). 
From that primary point of transition, the focus was then to build the business model to 
explicitly prevent future near-death experiences and to build a strong foundation for the future 
of the company and re-build the company in a way that much better aligned with values of the 
employee/shareholders (at that time, one in the same). 
4.1.1 Triggers and Responses of Business Model Innovation 
This autoethnography provides the important context in which business model 
innovation occurred within the company. In essence, the process of business model 
innovation within Tesera was driven by certain trigger events that inspired the 
company to respond in the continual innovation its business model. In order to further 
clarify how the process of business model innovation occurred within Tesera, the key 
triggers and responses are summarized below 
Trigger #1: Departure of the previous Vice President, and the author (having little 
business experience) assuming the Vice President role/responsibilities 
Response: Insatiable appetite to learn and gain business knowledge 
• 
• 
• 
Learned from contemporary business books 
Learned from experiences of other businesses (i.e. workshops) 
Key recognition: Issues and challenges faced by Tesera were remarkably 
similar to other companies. Discovered immense value in sharing, 
listening, and learning from the business experience of other companies. 
Trigger #2: Financial triage (after departure of previous Vice President) 
Response: Keep things as simple as possible so all involved could understand 
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• Developed simple and transparent approach to address financial 
predicament 
• Outsourced bookkeeping and accounting (i.e. arms length, independent 
advice) 
Trigger #3: Increased bank scrutiny regarding Business Improvement Loans 
Response: Implementation of regular financial monitoring 
• Implemented regular monthly financial reporting and 
• Implemented use of financial ratios to provide clarity to Board 
Trigger #4: Shareholder buyback (from exited employees) 
Response: Utilization of the "keep it simple" approach 
• Recognition of the value of consistency in ensuring fairness . 
Trigger #5: Burden of Debt 
Response: Structured company so as not to put in a similar position again 
• Highly influenced the evolution of the business model 
Focus on efficiency (lean operations) and flexibility (resource velocity) 
• Established "4 pillars for recovery" 
o Aggressively reduce debt 
o Invest in company 
o Invest in employees 
o Invest in shareholders 
-influenced by the book Good to Great (Collins 2001) 
Sub-response: Invigorated and energized company ("call to action") 
• 
• 
Change from a structuralist to constructionist ontology 
The company took charge of defining its own future 
Trigger #6: Critically questioning the existing approach to software development 
-influenced by the book Crossing the Chasm (Moore 1991) 
Response: Recognition that market had dramatically changed 
• 
• 
• 
Recognized making software compatible with existing industry standard 
software was a better strategy than efforts to compete 
This was a more collaborative approach that recognized the strengths of 
each 
This was the conceptual beginning of the collaborative business model in 
which we focused on what we did best, and worked with others with 
what they did best and created mutual benefits. 
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Trigger #7: Influence from Contemporary Business Books 
Response: 
Small Giants (Burlingham 2005) 
• Provided inspiration and confidence for alternative approaches to 
business development 
• Provided ideas of how to accomplish great things with a company 
without growing in numbers. 
• Self-imposing constraints to maximize benefits from resources 
• Provide a rationalization for the collaborative business model (growing 
a great company by a network of collaborative companies) 
Blue Ocean Strategy (Kim and Mauborgne 2005) 
• Inspired us to think very differently of how we pursued opportunities. 
• Help to identify healthy opportunities (i.e. Blue Oceans) and unhealthy 
ones 
o Relationship-based opportunities 
o Clients who valued quality, value-added and proactive solutions 
• Focused on actively building long-term relationships for sustainable 
business 
Trigger #8: General implementation of the collaborative business model 
Response: Focus on building a collaborative network of like minded companies 
• Opportunities quickly developed through building the collaborative 
network 
Trigger #9: Implementation of collaborative business model on large scale projects 
Response: Illustrated benefits of collaborative business model and considerations 
for the evolution of collaborative business model 
• Strong project leadership is paramount 
• Cohesion and positive culture amongst team members is an important 
asset to build and nurture 
• Proactive cash flow management is critical 
• Proactive and highly responsive communication (team and client) is 
critical 
Trigger #10: Experience from application of collaborative business model 
Response: Evolution of the collaborative business model 
• 
• 
Criteria established for assessing/developing opportunities 
Internal improvements to IT management 
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• Migration to cloud computing 
• Adoption of virtual office environments 
• Demonstrated resilience 
• Horizontal integration by collaboration 
4.1.2 The Resulting Description of Tesera's Collaborative Business Model 
As described throughout the autoethnography (and as summarized through the triggers 
and responses above) the process of business model innovation and the development of the 
collaborative business model was very much a self-directed learning process and is certainly a 
work in progress (of which it will always be). One of the key aspects that helped solidify the 
shift in how we conducted business was the actual naming of our business model as a 
"collaborative business model". The name, in itself, succinctly encapsulated the essence of our 
distinctively different way of conducting business (i.e. collaborating versus competing) . This 
central philosophy of collaboration within our business model was key to orienting our 
company internally as well as externally with collaborators and clients. 
While the process of business model innovation and the development of the 
collaborative business model has been detailed above, in order to provide further clarity, 
Tesera's collaborative business model (as it currently exists) is described as follows: 
• The central principle of Tesera's collaborative business model is to focus on what we do 
best, and to collaborate with other companies who focus on what they do best; thereby 
enabling growth in greatness and influence, but not size. 
• Our resources and capabilities are a function of our collaborative network and, as a 
result, are highly responsive to increased (or decreased) needs. 
• The focus is on the proactive development of business opportunities through building 
long-term relationships; thereby resulting in no (or very little) competition. 
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• Specific criteria have been developed in order to provide a highly focused approach for 
developing and pursuing opportunities that contribute to the long-term sustainable 
business relationships (with collaborators and clients) and the achievement of profit 
generating criteria. 
4.2 Business Model Innovation Theories/Concepts that are Supported by this Case 
One of the most stimulating aspects of this MBA project has been to see the linkages and 
parallels ofTesera's experiences to existing business model innovation theories, concepts and 
frameworks. These linkages and similarities provide the ability to gain a much deeper 
understanding of the business model innovation experience that Tesera went through. As such, 
it helps to provide greater insight as to how to continually innovate and evolve the 
collaborative business model, as well as provided practical insight to those who are either 
currently undertaking, or considering business model innovation. 
4.2.1 Needs for Business Model Innovation 
Tesera's motivations for business model innovation are very consistent to the needs for 
business model innovation as suggested by Johnson (2010). First, there was a critical need to 
change the profit formula. As outlined in the autoethnography, the cost structures and the 
manner in which business was being pursued in a highly competitive and low margin 
environment had resulted in the near bankruptcy situation, and critical change was vital. In a 
similar context, relating to Drucker's (1994) "Theory of the Business", the existing industry and 
market had changed so much that the existing theory of Tesera's business was no longer valid. 
Second, due to the financial predicament of the company (and the diminished resources), 
Tesera needed to find a way to move forward with an alternative way to assemble resources 
and capabilities (i.e. collaboration) (similar to Porter's (1996, 62) concept of strategic 
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positioning of" ... performing different activities from rivals' or performing similar activities in 
different ways"). Finally, third, there was a critical need to change business norms, rules and 
metrics (and underlying culture and fundamental business beliefs- as explained below) in 
order to run a profitable business and deliver the customer value proposition under a new 
collaborative business model. 
4.2.2 Emphasis on Cultural and Ontological changes to Enable Business Model 
Innovation 
In retrospect, the "near death" experience at Tesera was a pivotal event that allowed a 
clear break from existing culture and norms and provided the opportunity to establish different 
norms (i.e. consistent with Johnson [2010]) that placed a critical emphasis on building long-
term relationships with clients, collaborative companies and employees (and even extended to 
promoting relationships within the communities through employee incentives). It was a move 
from a very transactional relationship approach, to a much more transformational relationship 
approach. 
This occurred alongside the change in our corporate belief to a much more 
constructionist ontology in which we were in control of actively defining our future, rather than 
being a passive participant (consistent with Kim and Mauborgne 2004). This philosophical 
belief enabled us to define our company based on our values and what was important, and to 
"weave" these values into how the company operated internally and externally and build the 
"cultural fabric" of the company. 
This cultural shift within our company then influenced the nature of our collaborative 
business model and how we conducted our business and approached and developed 
opportunities. As noted earlier, this was explicitly defined in criteria that we used to assess 
opportunities that were "healthy" for the company in termed of contributing to the things that 
would grow our collaborative business model (i.e. long-term relationship with clients, 
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opportunities to strengthen our collaborative network). 
4.2.3 Improving Resource Velocity and Cost Structures through Business Model 
Innovation 
A large motivation for the evolution of business model innovation within Tesera was 
the quest for flexibility and efficiency and consistently adhering to the principal of developing a 
great company in influence, but not in size. These self-imposed constraints forced the company 
to develop innovative and creative responses. This was a vastly different approach than Tesera 
previously employed, and very different from our previous competitors. This allowed us to 
deliver and enhance value to existing and new clients in a much different way (i.e. collaborative 
business model) that fit well with expanding into different markets and expanding in scale and 
scope of projects without necessarily expanding the firm's internal resources. This relates very 
well to the concept of increasing resource velocity (i.e. much better ability to quickly adjust 
resources to match demands) which contributes to improving the profit formula (consistent 
with Johnson [2010]). Furthermore, this also contributed to the evolution of the revenue model 
through the collaborative business model. Such changes to increase resource velocity (by using 
collaborative resources) also enabled us to identify opportunities to improve our cost 
structures. As a result, the collaborative business model approach forced our thinking into 
identifying what Tesera did best, and working with others with what they did best. If there was 
a way to do things better, more efficiently, and more profitably, then this collaborative business 
model focused the firm to look at options that would achieve the same (or better) results. This 
focused approach enabled us to develop the criteria to assess (or develop) opportunities that 
specifically linked the type of collaborative partners to the benefit they provided to Tesera (i.e. 
specialized expertise to secure opportunities, strengthening collaborative network, technical 
"horsepower") and the respective profit margins associated with the collaborative partners. 
Again, this relates very well to Johnson's (2010) concept of cost structure within the profit 
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formula, and in particular, not to accept traditional cost structures as a given (i.e. but rather to 
look for innovation in the cost structure itself). 
4.2.4 Types of Business Model Innovation 
In relating to Johnson's (2010) types of business model innovation (i.e. white space 
within, white space beyond and white space between), Tesera's business model innovation 
experience touched on all three types. 
In changing to a business model which emphasized the development of long-term 
business relationships, there was a much greater emphasis in proactively seeking out and 
bringing innovative solutions to clients (that they may not have even considered), but were 
well aligned to alleviating their corporate "pains" in alternative ways (more efficient/ effective). 
This approach is very consistent with Johnson's "white space within" in which opportunities 
arise by fulfilling important but unsatisfied needs in existing markets. This is also very well 
aligned to the "edge-centric" strategy suggested by Nunes and Breene (2011), whereby the 
periphery of the market is continually scanned for untapped or unmet customer needs. 
Using the collaborative business model, Tesera's important emphasis on active 
development of opportunities (as opposed to passive and highly competitive opportunities 
such as RFP, ITT, etc.) was a way in which Tesera created new and uncontested markets. This is 
consistent with Johnson, "white space beyond" which involved the creation of new market 
space, and is also consistent with Kim and Mauborgne's (2005) concept of creating new 
markets of uncontested market space. 
Lastly, Tesera's core business really links well to the last type of business model 
innovation that Johnson (2010) suggests: the "white space between". These are opportunities 
arising to address industry discontinuities (e.g. market shifts, new technology, or changes in 
government policy). Tesera's core capabilities are very well oriented to helping clients reduce 
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uncertainties (and risks associated with uncertainty). The tools and services that Tesera offers 
to clients provide the opportunity to test various alternative scenarios or sensitivities to 
provide a better understanding of the changes and reduce uncertainties and risks. As described 
in the autoethnography, these were first applied in the forestry sector (i.e. to better understand 
changes in government policy, sustainable forest management, forest certification, etc.) but 
through business model innovation, (i.e. collaborative business model), Tesera has been able to 
develop opportunities in other sectors (i.e. water management, energy, environment impact 
assessment, insurance) and markets that have similar requirements for better understanding 
uncertainty and risks associated with discontinuity within industries and markets. 
A key point to recognize from Tesera's experience (which is quite clear from the above) 
is that different types of business model innovation aren't mutually exclusive. In reality, the 
business model innovation can have characteristics of each of these types proposed by Johnson 
(2010). 
4.2.5 The Importance of the Business Model 
As described earlier by Chesborough (2010), it is a strong business model that is the key 
to success (as opposed to technological innovation with a poor business model). Tesera's 
experience with business model innovation certainly supports the importance of a well-
thought-out business model and that business model innovation can be a very valuable process 
that can dramatically change the fortunes of a business. As was illustrated through the 
autoethnography, the process of business model innovation and deriving value in a significantly 
different way is what changed the fortunes ofTesera and led to success. 
4.3 Learning from this Experience and Considerations for Future Business Model 
Innovation 
This project has provided a tremendous amount of insight and ability to better 
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understand the process of business model innovation and relating this to the actual experience 
ofTesera. As described above, there was substantial alignment with existing concepts, 
frameworks and theories related to business models and business model innovation. In 
addition, there have also been some things that have been learned from this experience which 
can help augment the understanding and knowledge of business model innovation. 
4.3.1 Understanding Implicit Business Model Innovation 
Business model innovation can be a deliberate and planned process if it is well 
understood from the outset. Alternatively, it can also happen implicitly through real world 
business experiences, just as it did with Tesera. Understanding these implicit experiences will 
be a key to better understanding and improving upon the concepts and theories of business 
model innovation. As has been shown in this project, an autoethnography is a powerful way to 
examine the process of implicit business model innovation and reveal important factors 
contributing to business model innovation. 
4.3.2 Crisis as an Opportunity for Business Model Innovation 
As described, a crisis is actually a critical opportunity for business model innovation. It 
forces a company to look at things in a different way, to do things differently, to critically 
examine tradeoffs (to look at which self-imposed constraints can provide the razor sharp focus 
that is needed to survive, recover, and prosper). This focus provides the keen ability to then 
develop the strategy for moving forward and to innovate and evolve the business model in a 
very disciplined way (e.g. developing criteria to evaluate projects/opportunities to develop and 
pursue, identifying and evaluating enabling technology to contribute to the operational and 
efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of the business model, etc.) 
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4.3.3 Business Model Innovation: a Mindset 
Business model innovation is as much a mindset as a process. It requires a belief that a 
company can guide its own future and has the ability to influence and change markets. It 
requires a mindset of not accepting that things have to be done in a certain way (i.e. not take 
existing ways of doing business as a given). It is about having the confidence and fortitude to 
ask the big questions and consistently look for alternative ways to improve the value to the 
customer as well as the firm. 
4.3.4 Business Model Innovation: Source of Inspiration and a Guiding Light 
As in Tesera's experience, business model innovation can be a very powerful and 
transformational process. As described above, it involves a change in belief and mindset in 
creating a vision and framework for the future (which the company defines for itself according 
to important values for how it wishes to conduct business). As described in the 
autoethnography, this is a very empowering process that inspires passion and commitment 
within the company. As progress is made through the process of business model innovation, 
these sentiments become even more engrained in the company. This creates a strong desire to 
continually improve and innovate the business model. In essence, the process of business 
model innovation itself inspires transformational change. Furthermore, the business model 
itself provides a focus (i.e. guiding light) for innovation. For Tesera, the collaborative business 
model is a lens that provides the focus to assess both internal and external opportunities, 
innovations and improvements in terms of how these will strengthen and further enhance the 
business model and the business itself (e.g. development of opportunities, selection of 
collaborative partners, enhancement of corporate culture, adoption of emerging technology, 
strategic development). 
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4.3.5 Business Model Innovation- Considerations Moving Forward 
As shown through the experience of Tesera, business model innovation is an ongoing 
and evolutionary process that is guided and fueled by the creativity and passion of the firm in 
responding to change. It is important to continually look for ways in which the business model 
can be improved in order to continue to build value for customers and the company. 
One of the most beneficial things that we have found with the collaborative business 
model that Tesera uses is that it has built in incentives for embracing change, whether it be 
emerging technology, defining new markets, or innovative approaches. Because the strength of 
this business model is in the collaborative linkages that are built, the incentive is to continue to 
seek out collaborative relationships, tools and processes that strengthen the collaborative 
business model. By its nature, this collaborative business model is not defined by a particular 
industry or market, and is really only limited by the imagination and creativity of the company. 
This illustrates a key consideration for further business model innovation which is the ability 
for a business model to continually grow and evolve in order to continually and efficiently 
expand markets. 
Just as we have done with Tesera, new frontiers in business can be explored by 
leveraging the results of business model innovation to provide alternative ways to traditional 
approaches to business (e.g. horizontal integration through the collaboration rather than 
merger and acquisition). A key consideration to using business model innovation to push the 
frontiers of business with alternative approaches is in the mind set and belief that there are no 
boundaries to how things can be done, rather, the more important thing is to continually 
question whether there are better ways to get the job done (for the customer and the 
company). 
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5 Conclusion 
This project has been an extremely fascinating process of delving into the concepts of 
business models and business model innovation and linking it to the actual experience of 
business model innovation within our firm. From the perspective ofTesera, this has provided 
an incredible amount of insight to our experience regarding business model innovation and has 
enabled a much better understanding of the intuitive process that Tesera went through in the 
initial development of its collaborative business model and the continual innovation that has 
occurred. This deeper understanding of business model innovation certainly contributes to 
how Tesera can further continue to develop its business model innovation process. 
It is also anticipated that by sharing this first-hand experience through this 
autoethnography, it provides a very unique and in-depth manner by which others can 
understand and appreciate the various facets and complexity of business model innovation and 
learn about this process in a real world context. As illustrated through Tesera's experience, the 
process of business model innovation can be quite an intuitive and implicit process; however, 
the better that it is understood, the greater the ability to improve and continue to innovate the 
business model and produce long-term and sustainable benefits for the firm. 
A number of areas for future study have also been revealed through this project. In 
particular, a greater use of the autoethnography (or ethnography) as a research design will be 
very beneficial to improving the understanding of business model innovation from practical 
experiences. Another interesting topic for further study is the role of crisis (as an opportunity) 
for business model innovation. Similarly, examining the change in mindset (i.e. toward a 
constructionist ontology) in the business model innovation process would be a very interesting 
area for future study. One final consideration (as demonstrated by this project) is that the 
context of the business is a very important element in understanding the complexity of the 
process of business model innovation. This, again, underscores the value of using 
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contemporary research designs that emphasize context (e.g. autoethnography/ ethnography) to 
gain unique insights and better understanding of complex processes such as business model 
innovation. 
In summary, this project has provided a very in-depth illustration of the power and benefit 
of both the business model and business model innovation in dramatically transforming a 
company. As shown throughout this paper, business model innovation and the resulting 
business model were critical aspects not only for the survival of Tesera, but also for the 
recovery and sustainable future success of the firm. This, in itself, demonstrates how important 
it is to understand business models and business model innovation. The more a company can 
understand its business model and the process of business model innovation, the more likely it 
will be to create conditions that provide for sustainable growth and success. 
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